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Out of Many, One: Discovering 
the Shared Statutory Speech Community 
Through Corpus Linguistics 
Clarity depends on context, which legislative history may 
illuminate. The process is objective; the search is not for 
the contents of the authors’ heads but for the rules of 
language they used.1 
– Judge Frank Easterbrook 
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INTRODUCTION 
Law is communication,2 and communication requires the parti-
cipation of two or more parties. In the legal context, these parties 
are the legislature and the public. The language that the national 
legislature (i.e., Congress) produces, including floor statements, 
debates, bills, resolutions, and motions proposed, is conveniently 
collected in the Congressional Record.3 But this record is often contro-
versial—causing perhaps the deepest divide in judicial philosophy 
for at least the past half-century—as judges, attorneys, and 
academics debate the merits of turning to this legislative history. 
One of the chief criticisms of using legislative history to form 
interpretive opinions is that it amounts to little more than “looking 
over a crowd and picking out your friends.”4 And some of the most 
vehement criticism is reserved for the assumption that Congress 
 
 2. See, e.g., Mark Greenberg, Legislation as Communication? Legal Interpretation and the 
Study of Linguistic Communication, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LANGUAGE IN THE 
LAW 217 (Andrei Marmor & Scott Soames eds., 2011). But see Victoria F. Nourse, Elementary 
Statutory Interpretation: Rethinking Legislative Intent and History, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1613, 1614 
(2014) (noting that asserting law is communication is an incomplete theory). While “[s]ome 
have suggested that statutes are particular kinds of communicated meanings—commands 
to judges and citizens”—this theory is “true but incomplete” because “[s]uch a view 
imagines law made from ‘nowhere.’” Id. Every statute is surrounded by “an electoral and 
procedural context.” Id. (emphasis omitted). Thus, “[i]t is no exaggeration to say that, 
without that context, democracy evaporates. A statute’s legitimacy in our constitutional 
order depends upon context: that the law is the product of an elective, democratic process 
rather than autocratic fiat.” Id. 
 3. The Congressional Record, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/legislative 
/congrecord.htm (last visited Jan. 19, 2019) [hereinafter Congressional Record]. 
 4. Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 
Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 214 (1983) (quoting Judge Harold Leventhal). 
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had any intent on a specific issue, the argument being that meaning 
is found “not in the subjective, multiple mind of Congress but in 
the understanding of the objectively reasonable person.”5 
On one extreme of this debate, a minority advocates never 
consulting legislative history; on the other, another minority advo-
cates always consulting it, even if the text is otherwise plain.6 The 
vast majority of interpreters, however, fall somewhere between 
these two extremes. Because most of these interpreters acknow-
ledge that the text is the primary source of law and the clearest 
indication of legislative intent,7 the debate surrounding statutory 
interpretation has focused principally on just one of the 
communicating parties—the public, as measured by ordinary 
public meaning—to the neglect of the other party—the legislature, 
as measured by legislative intent.8 
But legislative intent can be approximated without focusing on 
the more controversial aspects of using legislative history. Speci-
fically, the interpreter can more closely approximate legislative 
intent by focusing on the semantic context contained in legislative 
history. Indeed, a better understanding of speech communities 
reveals that merely focusing on the ordinary public meaning is 
unnecessary and insufficient. 
Still, for the vast majority of interpreters, legislative history is a 
helpful supplement in cases of statutory ambiguity. In such 
instances, some uses of legislative history are more controversial 
than others. Perhaps the most controversial use is to determine the 
actual meaning Congress intended the statute to have, even if the 
statutory text is otherwise plain. A less controversial use is to have 
 
 5. Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 59, 65 (1988); see also ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: 
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 32 (1997) (“That a majority of both houses of Congress . . . 
entertained any view with regard to such issues is utterly beyond belief. For a virtual 
certainty, the majority was blissfully unaware of the existence of the issue, much less had any 
preference as to how it should be resolved.”). 
 6. LINDA D. JELLUM & DAVID CHARLES HRICIK, MODERN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: 
PROBLEMS, THEORIES, AND LAWYERING STRATEGIES 222 (2d ed. 2009). 
 7. Id. 
 8. There are legitimate reasons for focusing on the public: “[I]t assures notice to the 
public, protects reliance interests, assures consistency of application, and respects the will of 
the legislative body.” Thomas R. Lee & Stephen C. Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, 127 
YALE L.J. 788, 793 (2018). 
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legislative history determine the context surrounding the debate 
and passage of the statute.9 
This Note highlights an important but neglected contextual use 
of legislative history—determining the semantic usage employed 
by Congress when passing a law. This Note also proposes that this 
is simultaneously the use of legislative history least subject to 
criticism and most likely to illuminate the meaning of the text. True, 
these uses are still subject to other criticisms of legislative history, 
such as “salt[ing] the record.”10 So a better approach for deter-
mining semantic context might be to look at more than just the 
debate immediately surrounding the statute in question.11 When a 
speaker is involved in a debate, the speaker will be more careful 
about word choice, which means the speaker’s word choice is less 
likely to convey meaning in the ordinary sense.12 Thus, looking to 
the way Congress uses the disputed word or phrase in other 
debates may illuminate an ordinary congressional usage, or at least 
 
 9. See Nourse, supra note 2, at 1614. 
 10. “[T]o the degree that judges are perceived as grasping at any fragment of 
legislative history for insights into congressional intent, to that degree will legislators be 
encouraged to salt the legislative record with unilateral interpretations of statutory 
provisions they were unable to persuade their colleagues to accept.” JOHN F. MANNING & 
MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION & REGULATION 153–54 (2d ed. 2013) (quoting Int’l 
Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local Union No. 474 v. NLRB, 814 F.2d 697, 717 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). 
Justice Kavanaugh expanded on the salting the record criticism: “as a functional matter, 
committee reports and floor statements too often reflect an effort by a subgroup in 
Congress—or, worse, outside of it—to affect how the statute will subsequently be interpreted 
and implemented, in ways that Congress and the President may not have intended.” Brett M. 
Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118, 2149 (2016) (reviewing 
ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES (2014)). 
 11. Many judges have looked to the term’s usage in the broader statutory scheme to 
understand the congressional meaning of the term. For example, Judge Easterbrook, an 
ardent textualist, admits that “legislative intent is a vital source of meaning even though it 
does not trump the text[,]” in situations when “doubt about the meaning of a term found in 
the statute could well be resolved by harmonizing that provision with the structure of the 
rest of the law, understood in light of a contemporaneous explanation.” In re Sinclair, 870 
F.2d 1340, 1344 (7th Cir. 1989). 
 12. An analysis of the speaker’s language outside the debate could be much more 
fruitful. Cf. Jennifer L. Mascott, The Dictionary as a Specialized Corpus, 2017 BYU L. REV. 1557, 
1558–59 (noting that dictionaries define words (the debate) but also use those same words to 
define other words (usage outside debate)). Dictionary definitions are subject to bias on the 
part of the definer. Similarly, a congresswoman might alter language, even inadvertently, in 
a given situation, but there would be no alteration in the course of a different conversation. 
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help determine the range of possible congressional usages of 
the term. 
In this manner, the legislative history can be treated as a 
specialized dictionary of possible congressional lexical usage, just 
as a dictionary lists the possible usages for a given word. But by 
using the Congressional Record to determine ordinary congressional 
usage, the interpreter runs the risk of falling into the same fallacies 
as those who use dictionaries to determine ordinary meaning.13 So 
what is the weary traveler in search of statutory meaning to do? 
Comb the vast desert of the Congressional Record for other uses of 
the disputed term? This would be a monumental task, at best, and 
an invitation for the interpreter to scan over the crowd looking for 
friends, at worst. 
This Note proposes that the Congressional Record be used as a 
mini-corpus14 as part of the emerging field of law and corpus 
linguistics.15 Thus far, corpus linguistics in the legal setting has 
principally been used to study the public’s speech community to 
determine the ordinary public meaning.16 So, this Note proposes 
studying the legislature’s speech community with a corpus of the 
 
 13. See id. at 1558 (“The idea is that by studying the context of how a word is used in 
natural language the interpreter can acquire a more unbiased picture of ‘ordinary meaning’ 
than by consulting dictionaries—written for the express purpose of inviting ‘linguistic 
scrutiny.’” (footnotes omitted)). 
 14. See id. at 1559, for a discussion on the benefits of “mini-corpora.” A mini-corpus 
focuses on a specific speech community, as opposed to a general corpus, which “contain[s] 
a wide variety of documents such as letters, newspapers, pamphlets, and speeches—
representing the language usage of a large community.” Id. Thus, a mini-corpus is 
“specialized, focusing just ‘on a particular linguistic community, such as a particular region, type 
of language user, or genre of language.’” Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added); see also Lee 
& Mouritsen, supra note 8, at 830–31 (“Special corpora are limited to a particular genre, 
register, or dialect[,]” while general corpora “represent the language used by a broad (often 
national) speech community.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 15. Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 8, at 863–64 (“We have not sought to study intended 
meaning in our corpus analysis. But as noted above we think such a study is possible. One 
approach would be to think of interpreter as a term used by lawmakers, and to look for 
evidence of usage in this speech community. If we assembled such evidence, then we could 
have the debate flagged above—as to whether intended meaning should win out over public 
meaning, or whether they ought to collapse together as a matter of theory.”). 
 16. Ordinary public meaning corpora include the Corpus of Historical American 
English (COHA) and the Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA), among 
others. CORPUS HIST. AM. ENG., https://corpus.byu.edu/coha (last visited Jan. 19 2019) 
[hereinafter COHA]; CORPUS CONTEMP. AM. ENG., https://corpus.byu.edu/coca (last visited 
Jan. 19, 2019) [hereinafter COCA]. 
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Congressional Record to determine ordinary congressional mean-
ing.17 And just as some have proposed using the dictionary as a 
corpus,18 my proposed Congressional Record as Corpus (CRAC) 
would provide the interpreter with an empirically based range of 
possible ordinary meaning.19 Thus, the interpreter avoids scanning 
over a crowd to pick out friends because the crowd’s disparate 
voices unite into a single reference point.20 
By comparing and contrasting the public’s speech community 
with the legislature’s speech community, the interpreter can study 
the resulting shared statutory speech community. By checking the 
respective public and congressional registers, we can know if a 
term is more “ordinary” or more “congressional.” Hopefully, the 
term will have similar senses in the respective registers;21 however, 
even if each register offers a distinct sense of the term, comparing 
the two registers still promotes transparency22 in interpretation by 
clearly showing the interpreter that a choice must be made between 
two competing and overarching values: promoting notice or 
respecting legislative intent.23 
 
 17. While the theory has been noted in passing by other authors, a method for 
implementing a corpus based on congressional meaning has not been proposed until now. 
See supra note 15. 
 18. See Mascott, supra note 12. 
 19. The difference between a non-corpus versus a corpus approach to ordinary 
meaning is significant: “The first scenario is a metaphysical debate; the second is an empirical 
one. . . . [T]he corpus method removes the determination of ordinary meaning from the black 
box of the judge’s mental impression and renders the discussion of ordinary meaning one of 
tangible and quantifiable reality.” Stephen C. Mouritsen, The Dictionary Is Not a Fortress: 
Definitional Fallacies and a Corpus-Based Approach to Plain Meaning 2010 BYU L. REV. 1915, 
1970 (2010). 
 20. Similar to how a dictionary’s disparate definitions can be united into a single mini-
corpora. See Mascott, supra note 12, at 1559. 
 21. Cf. Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 8, at 875 (noting that corpus analysis is contextual 
within a particular register at a particular time). Ideally the two senses of meaning—intended 
meaning and public meaning—overlap completely. 
 22. See id. at 858 (“[W]e will simply say for now that transparent answers are better 
than opaque ones. Further thinking on this problem is needed. Yet surely we will be better 
off with an open, transparent discussion about whether (and when) to give primacy to 
intended meaning and when to credit public meaning. Once we speak more carefully about 
the meaning we are looking for and proceed more reliably in trying to measure it, we can 
have a better dialogue about these difficult questions of legal theory.”) 
 23. Such weighing of competing values, interests, and rights is the reason techno-
logical tools such as corpus linguistics will never replace judges. Cf. Carissa Byrne Hessick, 
Corpus Linguistics and Criminal Law, 2017 BYU L. REV. 1503, 1517 (2017) (“[J]ustice may only 
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Part I of this Note explains how congressional intent fits within 
interpretive theory. It also analyzes why congressional intent is 
important and how it differs from ordinary public meaning. Part II 
explores contextual uses of legislative history—one of the main 
evidences of congressional intent—for those uses that help reveal 
the context surrounding a given statute. Part III advocates using the 
Congressional Record as a mini-corpus, which will optimize the use 
of legislative history while potentially resolving textualist criti-
cisms of its use. In Part IV, this congressional meaning mini-corpus 
is applied to Muscarello v. United States24 and then compared with 
the results of an ordinary public meaning corpus. This Note 
concludes by encouraging the creation of a full congressional 
meaning corpus to analyze the shared statutory speech community. 
I. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: WHY BOTH PUBLIC MEANING 
AND CONGRESSIONAL INTENT MATTER 
Communication is the “process by which information is 
exchanged between individuals through a common system of 
symbols, signs, or behavior[.]“25 Statutory law is fundamentally a 
form of communication—Congress speaks, and the public hears.26 
And as communication, law shares its “fundamental problem”: 
“reproducing at one point either exactly or approximately a 
message selected at another point.”27 This reproduction problem in 
the legal context is called interpretation—the process of 
 
be meted out by people. By replacing the case-by-case exercise of human judgment with a 
mechanical calculus, we do not judge better or more objectively, nor do we judge worse. 
Instead, we cease to judge at all.” (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
Corpus linguistics merely increases transparency and highlights interpretive questions that 
have previously remained hidden. Only humans are capable of passing “the test of a first-
rate intelligence[:] the ability to hold two opposed ideas in the mind at the same time, and 
still retain the ability to function.” F. Scott Fitzgerald, The Crack-Up, ESQUIRE: CLASSIC (Feb. 1, 
1936), https://classic.esquire.com/the-crack-up. 
 24. Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125 (1998). 
 25. Communication, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/diction 
ary/communication (last visited Jan. 9, 2019). 
 26. See Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 8, at 815–16; Lawrence B. Solum, Communicative 
Content and Legal Content, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 479, 485–86 (2013). 
 27. C.E. Shannon, A Mathematical Theory of Communication, 27 BELL SYS. TECH. J. 379, 
379 (1948). 
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understanding what the author(s) intended to communicate.28 
Statutory interpretation is a search for the meaning of a text, and 
“[t]o assess meaning, . . . we must also take into account the 
relevant speech community . . . .”29 These laws are made up of 
individual words that only gather meaning through context.30 
In other words, language does not exist in a vacuum; it requires 
a common group of speakers and hearers known as a speech 
community. A speech community is any group of people sharing a 
common set of linguistic norms and expectations about how their 
language should be used.31 Just as language requires a speech com-
munity, statutes require an interpretive community. This shared 
statutory speech community is comprised of both the congres-
sional speech community and the public speech community. The 
judiciary is then tasked with interpreting the shared statutory 
speech community’s conversations, specifically the legislature’s 
statutory “symbols.”  When doing so, the judiciary has traditionally 
focused on determining meaning through what an ordinary 
member of the public would understand.32  
Focusing on ordinary meaning requires an initial choice: whose 
ordinary meaning to choose? In this context, the question is which 
speech community’s ordinary meaning to choose—the public’s or 
the legislature’s?33 The promotion of either community offers a 
 
 28. Larry Alexander, Originalism, the Why and the What, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 539, 
539 (2013). 
 29. Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 8, at 818. 
 30. John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 
70, 70 (2006). Thus, language correlates to many legal principles, because it likewise cannot 
exist in a vacuum. For example, property rights only exist in relation to another person. Just 
like a castaway’s “property rights” are illusory, so too are any “statutes” that the castaway 
might create. See WILLIAM LILLIE, AN INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS 259 (2003). 
 31. GEORGE YULE, THE STUDY OF LANGUAGE 284 (6th ed. 2016). 
 32. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 188 (1824) (“The enlightened patriots who framed 
our constitution, and the people who adopted it, must be understood to have employed 
words in their natural sense, and to have intended what they have said.”); see also ANTONIN 
SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 69 (2012) 
(“The ordinary-meaning rule is the most fundamental semantic rule of interpretation.”). 
 33. Lawrence M. Solan, The New Textualists’ New Text, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 2027, 2059–
60 (2005). This decision has enormous “implications for the selection of a relevant corpus[,]” 
because “[i]f we are trying to measure intended meaning, we might want to gather data from 
a corpus of a community of speakers who look demographically like Congress. Yet if we are 
interested in public meaning, we would want to turn to a broader corpus.” Lee & Mouritsen, 
supra note 8, at 858. 
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distinct benefit: analyzing the public promotes “the notice function 
of the law” while analyzing the legislature promotes “deference to 
the presumed intent of the lawmaker.”34  But focusing exclusively 
on either speech community is incomplete. Only by comparing the 
two halves of the shared statutory speech community can the 
interpreter accurately capture ordinary meaning. 
A. Ordinary Public Meaning 
The law is “a solemn expression of legislative will. It orders and 
permits and forbids. It announces rewards and punishments. Its 
provisions generally relate not to solitary or singular cases, but to 
what passes in the ordinary course of affairs.”35 It is neither merely 
a passive hearing on the part of the audience nor a vain expression 
on the part of the legislature. Rather, it is a declaration that is meant 
to be obeyed. Thus, what the audience understands by a given 
statute is vital to determining what that statute means. 
There are two main reasons judges and scholars have tended to 
focus only on ordinary public meaning. First, preserving notice 
values requires that meaning be determined by the public’s 
ordinary vernacular and usage.36 Second, relying on ordinary 
public meaning avoids the problem of searching for the collective 
intent of a multimember body.37 Justice Frankfurter wrote that  
[i]f a statute is written for ordinary folk, it would be arbitrary not 
to assume that Congress intended its words to be read with the 
minds of ordinary men . . . . And so we assume that Congress uses 
 
 34. Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 8, at 788. There are many additional reasons for using 
the ordinary public meaning. Using ordinary public meaning “assures notice to the public, 
protects reliance interests, assures consistency of application, and respects the will of the 
legislative body.” Id. at 793. But it is important to note that textualists do not advocate the 
plain or ordinary meaning as part of “a silly belief that texts have timeless meanings divorced 
from their many contexts[.]” In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1344 (7th Cir. 1989). Nor do they 
“assum[e] that what is plain to one reader must be clear to any other (and identical to the 
plan of the writer)[.]” Id. Rather, the use of ordinary meaning rests “on the constitutional 
allocation of powers.” Id. 
 35. Law, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1933) (emphasis added) (quoting L.A. CIV. 
CODE arts. 1, 2 (1933)). 
 36. Alexander, supra note 28, at 541–42. 
 37. Id. at 542. 
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common words in their popular meaning, as used in the common 
speech of men.38  
Thus, ordinary public meaning is important because the public, as 
Congress’s audience, is required to obey the statutes passed. 
Passing and enforcing a law that is substantively or practically 
unintelligible to the public is unconscionable.  
 The traditional understanding of ordinary meaning is that it is 
an absolute term which does not permit multiple “ordinary mean-
ings” in a given context, although there may be several possible 
meanings. And ordinary meaning has traditionally been viewed as 
more important than possible meaning. Justice Scalia stated that the 
Court’s job “is to determine . . . the ordinary meaning[,]” rather 
than to “‘scavenge the world of English usage to discover whether 
there is any possible meaning.’”39 He also lamented that “[t]he 
Court does not appear to grasp the distinction between how a word 
can be used and how it ordinarily is used.”40 The problem is that 
“[l]egal interpretation is binary in nature and requires a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ 
answer to resolve the legal dispute at issue.”41 
 Recent scholarship, however, has advocated searching for 
ordinary meanings in the plural. One scholar, Jennifer Mascott, has 
queried, “Perhaps the proper question . . . [is] not whether English 
language speakers more frequently associate [a term] with [one 
meaning or another]. Maybe instead the court should have asked, 
what are all of the ordinary meanings of [the term] that fit properly 
within the statutory context?”42 This “multiple ordinary meanings 
 
 38. Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 
536 (1947). But the audience is not always “ordinary folk.” Compare Justice Frankfurter’s 
statement in the same article: “If they are addressed to specialists, they must be read by 
judges with the minds of the specialists.” Id. 
 39. Mouritsen, supra note 19, at 1953 (quoting Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 410 
(1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting)) (emphasis removed). 
 40. Id. at 1948 n.185 (quoting Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 242 (1993) (Scalia, 
J., dissenting)). 
 41. Stefan Th. Gries & Brian G. Slocum, Ordinary Meaning and Corpus Linguistics, 2017 
BYU L. REV 1417, 1435 (2017). This binary nature at times conflicts with linguistic 
understanding: “If, for example, the dispute involves a matter of categorization (e.g., is a 
Segway a vehicle?), the court must give a definitive answer even if language experts indicate 
that category membership among ordinary language users is properly viewed as a matter of 
degree.” Id. 
 42. Mascott, supra note 12, at 1557. 
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approach” poses significant ramifications for statutory inter-
pretation. If both senses of a term are ordinary, then perhaps the 
statute encompasses both.43 “In other words,” Mascott continues, 
“ordinary meaning might not mean picking the most common use 
of a term but rather, identifying the full range of actions encom-
passed by the permissible meanings of that term.”44 But whether 
the interpreter is looking for a single ordinary meaning or a range 
of meaning, ordinary meaning is, in essence, “an empirical 
question—about the sense of a word or phrase that is most likely 
implicated in a given linguistic context.”45 
The interpretive framework that most limits inquiry into 
congressional intent is textualism,46 which is closely tied to 
ordinary public meaning.47 Textualism can be broken down into 
two propositions: (1) there is no such thing as an authorial intent 
beyond the words of a statute, and (2) the only intent we should 
attribute to Congress is what the reasonable person would 
understand from the words of that statute.48 I readily agree with the 
former proposition. After all, the statutory text is unique in having 
survived the constitutionally mandated procedures of bicameral-
ism and presentment.49 But I disagree with the second proposition—
 
 43. See id.; see also Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 8, at 804–05 (discussing the dissent’s 
opinion in Taniguchi v. Kan Pacific Saipan, Ltd., 566 U.S. 560 (2012) that either of two 
common senses of a term could count as ordinary). 
 44. Mascott, supra note 12, at 1588. 
 45. Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 8, at 795. 
 46. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, The Unknown Ideal?, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1509, 
1516 (1998) (reviewing ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS 
AND THE LAW (1997)) (“I don’t care what [the legislature’s] intention was. I only want to 
know what the words mean.”). 
 47. Id. at 1512. 
 48. See Manning, supra note 30, at 73. 
 49. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7; see also Easterbrook, supra note 5, at 65 (“Imagine how 
we would react to a bill that said, ‘From today forward, the result of any opinion poll among 
members of Congress shall have the effect of law.’ We would think the law a joke at best, 
unconstitutional at worst. This silly ‘law’ comes uncomfortably close, however, to the 
method by which courts deduce the content of legislation when they look to subjective 
intent.”). Justice Scalia wrote that 
[t]he greatest defect of legislative history is its illegitimacy. We are governed by 
laws, not by the intentions of legislators. As the Court said in 1844: “The law as it 
passed is the will of the majority of both houses, and the only mode in which that will 
is spoken is in the act itself . . . .” 
Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Aldridge v. 
Williams, 44 U.S. 9, 24 (1844)). 
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limiting our inquiry to what the reasonable person would under-
stand from the words of a statute—for two reasons. 
First, Congress may have a different vernacular and word 
usage than the ordinary public. Second, if we also care about the 
will of the lawmaker and not just about protecting reliance interests 
and giving notice, we should care about any possible distinct 
language usage between the congressional speech community and 
the public speech community. Focusing on either half of the shared 
statutory speech community to the exclusion of the other is 
problematic because our concern for determining the shared 
understanding of a text means that the relevant speech community 
encompasses both the public and the legislature. The public does 
not pass its own laws, and the legislature does not pass laws merely 
for its own benefit. 
B. Ordinary Congressional Meaning 
The judiciary has traditionally focused on determining mean-
ing through what an ordinary member of the public would 
understand. But by focusing on one-half of the speech 
community—the public—the interpreter forgets that the shared 
statutory speech community also includes Congress, not just the 
public. Thus, this Note proposes that the ordinary congressional 
meaning better incorporates another of statutory interpretation’s 
primary goals—giving effect to the will of the lawmaker.  
Congressional intent is central to interpretation in several 
aspects. First, our judicial system has traditionally focused on 
giving credit to the will of the lawmaker.50 Indeed, the statutory 
 
 50. See Middlesex Cty. Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 13 
(1981) (“The key to the inquiry is the intent of the Legislature.”); Gilead Sciences, Inc. v. Lee, 
778 F.3d 1341, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“In an effort to discern Congress’s intent, this court looks 
to ‘traditional tools of statutory construction.’”) (citation omitted); 1256 Hertel Ave. Assocs., 
LLC v. Calloway, 761 F.3d 252, 259 (2d Cir. 2014) (“[I]t is also ‘fundamental . . . to effectuate 
the intent of the Legislature.’”) (citation omitted); Jensen v. Pressler & Pressler, 791 F.3d 413, 
418 (3d Cir. 2015) (“Congress’s intent guides our interpretation of statutes.”); Cruz v. Abbott, 
849 F.3d 594, 599 n.8 (5th Cir. 2017) (“Texas courts aim to give effect to legislative 
intent . . . .”); Grand Trunk W. R.R. Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 875 F.3d 821, 829 (6th Cir. 2017) 
(“[I]n construing statutes, our primary goal is to effectuate legislative intent.”) (citation 
omitted); Sutula-Johnson v. Office Depot, Inc., 893 F.3d 967, 976 (7th Cir. 2018) (“We turn to 
the general rules of statutory interpretation in Illinois, where the ‘fundamental rule of 
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interpretation debate is really about the best way of reaching 
Congress’s intent. Whether the Court finds Congress’s intent in the 
text, the legislative history, or the legislative purpose, the Court’s 
goal is always to give effect to the will of the lawmaker.51 
Second, the will of the lawmaker is important as a matter of 
social contract theory52—the sovereign (the people) grants 
authority to a body (a constitutional convention, Congress, etc.) to 
enact rules.53 Those rules (representing the sovereign’s will) are 
meaningless if that body’s intent is not carried out. 
Further, focusing on the speaker as well as the hearer is 
important,54 in part because the public expects Congress to speak 
as Congress and not as an ordinary person.55 Indeed, “‘[t]here may 
 
statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature’s intent.’”) (citation 
omitted); Heavenly Hana LLC v. Hotel Union & Hotel Indus. of Haw. Pension Plan, 891 F.3d 
839, 844 (9th Cir. 2018) (“[W]e examine the legislative history, the statutory structure, and 
‘other traditional aids of statutory interpretation’ in order to ascertain congressional intent.”) 
(citation omitted); Obduskey v. Wells Fargo, 879 F.3d 1216, 1220 (10th Cir. 2018) (“[I]t is our 
primary task in interpreting statutes to determine congressional intent . . . .”) (citation 
omitted). But see SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 32, at 397 (“Intentionalist theorists and courts 
promote the idea that enacted texts merely evoke or suggest—as opposed to state—what the 
true law is. This [is a] fallacy . . . .”). At the risk of offending the legal citation pantheon, I am 
choosing to leave this string cite organized by circuit rather than year. However, I am not yet 
ready to join the angry mob in “burn[ing] all copies of the Bluebook[.]” Richard A. Posner, 
What Is Obviously Wrong with the Federal Judiciary, Yet Eminently Curable, 19 GREEN BAG 2d 
187, 193 (2016). 
 51. See cases cited supra note 50, for various approaches to reaching the legisla-
ture’s intent. 
 52. See generally THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (1651) (positing that to avoid a “solitary, 
poor, nasty, brutish and short” life, free men enter into a social contract to subject themselves 
to a sovereign, either a single person or an assembly); JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF 
GOVERNMENT (1690) (noting that people delegate some rights to government to preserve the 
rights of all); JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND DISCOURSES (1762) 
(noting that laws created by governments must be in accordance with general will of 
sovereign populace). 
 53. “In free Governments the rulers are the servants, and the people their superiors & 
sovereigns.” BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 398 
(Ralph L. Ketcham ed., 1965). 
 54. “[T]he notion of speaker’s meaning derived from the philosophy of language, 
which focuses on the meaning the speaker intended to convey to her audience based on the 
audience’s recognition of the speaker’s communicative intentions.” Nourse, supra note 2, at 
1624 n.44; see H.P. Grice, Utterer’s Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning, in 4 
FOUNDATIONS OF LANGUAGE 225, 225, 230 (1968). 
 55. The “ordinary person” is, of course, a legal fiction. Cf. Weinbaum v. City of Las 
Cruces, 541 F.3d 1017, 1031 (10th Cir. 2008) (“The objective or reasonable observer is kin to 
the fictitious ‘reasonably prudent person’ of tort law.”). Or, from a more colloquial source: 
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be good reasons for a legal system to prefer’ either public meaning 
or intended meaning. And ‘neither has to win every time,’ because 
the ‘right’ answer ‘depends on our reasons’ for the resort to 
ordinary meaning ‘in the first place.’”56 Language is inherently tied 
to context. For example, we interpret language differently when 
interviewing for a job as compared to speaking with a friend, just 
as we interpret language differently when reading Shakespeare as 
compared to reading Dr. Seuss—depending on the context, we 
expect a different conversation. So if Congress has a different 
vernacular and usage than the general public, and if we care about 
the will of the lawmaker—not just protecting reliance interests and 
notice—we should care about those possible distinctions in 
language usage. 
The choice between ordinary public meaning and ordinary 
congressional meaning has real-world consequences: “When the 
legal system decides to rely on the ordinary meaning of a word, it 
must also determine which interpretive community’s under-
standing it wishes to adopt.”57 The two principal communities are 
the public and the legislature. The public’s speech community is 
likely to be reflected in articles, newspapers, books, conversations, 
etc. But where does the interpreter find Congress’s speech 
community represented? The congressional speech community is 
found in the legislative history surrounding the creation of laws, 
which includes the legislature’s publications and conversations. 
The search for Congress’s intent leads through the valley of the 
shadow of legislative history. 
 
“There’s a notion I’d like to see buried: the ordinary person. Ridiculous. There is no ordinary 
person.” ALAN MOORE & DAVE GIBBONS, WATCHMEN: THE DELUXE EDITION 379 (2013). 
 56. Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 8, at 817 nn.127–28 and accompanying text (quoting 
William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1079, 1090–
91 (2017)). 
 57. “This choice is made tacitly in legal analysis but becomes overt when the analysis 
involves linguistic corpora, because the software displays the provenance of the usage on a 
screen in front of the researcher.” LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF STATUTES: LAWS 
AND THEIR INTERPRETATION 78 (2010). 
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C. Toward a More Perfect Statutory Interpretation 
As noted above, defining ordinary meaning is one of the more 
difficult questions of statutory interpretation: What does ordinary 
meaning mean?58 There are several possible answers: First, it could 
be the ordinary congressional meaning—what Congress intended; 
second, it could be the ordinary public meaning—what the public 
heard. These are the traditional answers. This Note proposes a third 
answer: ordinary meaning is not merely what Congress said or 
what the public heard, but rather something in the middle: what 
they together understood.59 This is the ideal situation—when the 
public and intended meanings overlap completely. Analyzing the 
ideal statutory situation requires acknowledging that language 
only has meaning in a specific context and speech community. 
Thus, the shared statutory speech community must include both 
Congress and the public. 
II. CONTEXTUAL USES OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
When interpreting a statute, the Court looks first to the enacted 
text. When the statute is clear, “[a]ll judges follow a simple rule . . . 
 
 58. Mouritsen noted, “When jurists speak of ‘ordinary meaning,’ they simply are not 
always talking about the same thing.” Mouritsen, supra note 19, at 1952; see generally Lee & 
Mouritsen, supra note 8, at 798 (“Ironically, we have no ordinary meaning of ‘ordinary 
meaning.’ The same goes for ‘plain meaning.’”) (footnote omitted). 
 59. Mouritsen stated that “[o]rdinary meaning has been characterized as ‘what . . . 
words would mean in the mouth of a normal speaker of English’ or how words ‘sound in 
the mind of a skilled, objectively reasonable user of words.’” Mouritsen, supra note 19, at 
1953 (footnote omitted). Thus, “[t]hese two characterizations are not identical. The skilled 
user of words and the normal speaker of English are not necessarily the same person.” Id. 
These two characterizations’ differences do not end with the respective skill of the user. 
There is a difference between “what . . . words . . . mean in the mouth” and how they “sound 
in the mind[.]” Id. Mouritsen also noted “both of these characterizations are grounded in the 
same principle, that ordinary meaning can be understood and analyzed in the context of 
ordinary usage.” Id. Yet while ordinary meaning and ordinary usage are so closely related 
that they are frequently compounded—they are not synonymous. “Almost certainly without 
intending to, judges who have invoked this ‘ordinary-meaning-as-common-usage’ 
characterization have implicated not merely a theory of ordinary meaning, but also a method 
for its analysis.” Id. at 1954. Unlike more qualitative notions of ordinary meaning, “the 
question of the ‘common usage’ of a statutory term may be answered quantifiably through 
a linguistic methodology called corpus linguistics.” Id. 
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apply it.”60 The Supreme Court has held that “[a]s always, we begin 
with the text of the statute.”61 Clear texts, however, are seldom 
litigated. Rather, the texts that make it to court are “ambiguous, or 
conflict[ed], or are so old that a once-clear meaning has been lost 
because of changes in the language or legal culture.”62 When the 
text is unclear, additional context is required to interpret the text. 
In fact, the text’s meaning can never be determined if divorced 
completely from context.63 And one of the most important ways to 
determine a statute’s context is by using legislative history: 
“[S]tatutes first gain meaning within the context that gave them life: 
the give and take of the legislative process[, so] we must read 
[them] within the context of the legislative process, which is 
reflected in the statute’s legislative history.”64 Whereas the text is 
the law enacted by the legislature, context merely attempts to help 
the interpreter see how the legislature understood the language 
it used.  
Legislative history can provide two different contexts relevant 
to statutory interpretation: policy-based context (how a reasonable 
person solves problems) and semantic context (how a reasonable 
 
 60. Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 61 (1994). 
 61. Limtiaco v. Camacho, 549 U.S. 483, 488 (2007); see also Neb. Dep’t of Revenue v. 
Loewenstein, 513 U.S. 123, 128 (1994). 
 62. Easterbrook, supra note 60, at 61. 
 63. See Manning, supra note 30, at 70. It is important to distinguish searching for the 
context in which words are used from searching for the intent of the author. Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes said that “[w]e do not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask only what 
the statute means.” Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. 
REV. 417, 419 (1899). Textualists have found an uneasy compromise with using legislative 
history by emphasizing its use as a revealer of context, but not of intent. Easterbrook noted, 
“Legislative history helps us learn what Congress meant by what it said, but it is not a source 
of legal rules competing with those found in the U.S. Code.” In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1344 
(7th Cir. 1989). 
 64. Paul E. McGreal, Slighting Context: On the Illogic of Ordinary Speech in Statutory 
Interpretation, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 325, 328 (2004). 
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person uses words).65 While each context is valuable,66 they are 
given different weight by the competing interpretive camps.67 
Purposivists favor policy-based context, while textualists lend 
greater weight to semantic context.68 
 
 65. Manning, supra note 30, at 92–96. There may be other forms of context that do not 
precisely follow these forms. See, e.g., Nourse, supra note 2, at 1615–16 (detailing Professor 
Nourse’s theory of procedural context). “When Congress passes a statute, it does so against 
a background context of rules, procedures and deliberation. That context does not exist in 
anyone’s head: it is public and constitutionally sanctioned. For years, we have called this 
context by the term ‘legislative history.’” Id. Thus, a group, such as Congress, recognizes as 
a group action that which has been “authorized by the group or part of that group’s 
organization or procedure.” Id. at 1626. The group’s intent is manifested by its actions as 
determined by its procedures. In a similar vein, a criminal case focuses on the accused’s 
actions to determine intent. Id. at 1628. Thus, groups may have an intent through the 
procedures the group has created. The creation of documents in the legislative history are 
governed by procedural rules and reveal an intent as a series of decisions culminating in the 
creation of a law. 
 66. For example, when the eighth-grade student in Anytown, U.S.A., is frustrated by 
one of Charles Dickens’s texts, the ever-patient English teacher tirelessly instructs her in the 
context of Dickens’s world. The distinction between policy-based context and semantic 
context is the difference between understanding the horrors of the Industrial Revolution that 
Dickens excoriated (policy-based) and the way Victorian English was used (semantic). 
 67. For example, Justice Sotomayor said that legislative history can be a “particularly 
reliable source to which we can look to ensure our fidelity to Congress’ intended meaning.” 
Dig. Realty Tr., Inc. v. Somers, 138 S. Ct. 767, 782 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citing 
Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76 (1984)). But Justice Thomas retorted that “Even 
assuming a majority of Congress read the Senate Report, agreed with it, and voted for [the 
bill] with the same intent, “we are a government of laws, not of men, and are governed by 
what Congress enacted rather than by what it intended.” Id. at 783 (quoting Lawson v. FMR 
LLC, 571 U.S. 429, 459–60 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)). 
Newcomers Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh seem to share Justice Thomas’s concern. 
Justice Gorsuch wrote, “while pre-enactment practice ‘can be relevant to the interpretation 
of an ambiguous text’ it has no force when the text is clear” because “whatever the legislative 
history may or may not suggest about Congress’s collective ‘intent’ (putting aside the 
difficulties of trying to say anything definitive about the intent of 535 legislators and the 
executive . . .), the law before us that survived the gauntlet of bicameralism and presentment 
couldn’t be plainer.” United States v. Games-Perez, 695 F.3d 1104, 1118 (10th Cir. 2012) 
(denying reh’g en banc) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). Justice Kavanaugh introduces an additional 
nuance to the legislative history debate: his principal concern seems to be that “[t]he clarity-
versus-ambiguity trigger for resorting to legislative history in the first place means that the 
decision is often indeterminate. That, in turn, greatly exacerbates the problems with the use 
of legislative history.” Brett Kavanaugh, The Role of the Judiciary in Maintaining the Separation 
of Powers, HERITAGE FOUND. (Feb. 1, 2018), https://www.heritage.org/courts/report/the 
-role-the-judiciary-maintaining-the-separation-powers. 
 68. Few interpreters will exclusively rely on legislative history, acknowledging that 
the text is the primary source of law and the clearest indication of legislative intent. JELLUM 
& HRICIK, supra note 6, at 222. Still, legislative history has been much maligned by textualist 
judges. See, e.g., Robert Barnes, Divining Congress’s Intent, WASH. POST (Apr. 22, 2012), 
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A. Policy-based Context 
The search for policy-based context reflects Justice Marshall’s 
statement that “[w]here the mind labours to discover the design of 
the legislature, it seizes every thing from which aid can be 
derived . . . .”69 Policy-based context includes evidence such as 
public knowledge of the evil the legislators intended to address; 
policies reflected in a statute’s preamble, title, or structure; and 
policies expressed in similar statutes.70 This evidence may also be 
found in the legislative history. 
For example, the majority in Muscarello used statements from 
the floor debates to advance their argument that the statute in 
question, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1), was passed “‘to persuade the man 
who is tempted to commit a Federal felony to leave his gun at 
home.’”71 These statements included one representative who said 
that the statute would apply to “the man who goes out taking a gun 
to commit a crime”72 Another representative said, “Of course, what 
we are trying to do by these penalties is to persuade the criminal to 
leave his gun at home.”73 Still another stated, “We are concerned . . . 
with having the criminal leave his gun at home.”74 The Muscarello 
Court assumed these statements adequately represented the 
statute’s policy-based context. The Court then aligned its definition 
of the relevant term, carry, with these statements. 
 
(“Scalia says that ‘examining the entrails of legislative history’ is a fool’s errand. He has 
denounced the practice of looking at committee reports, floor debates and legislative 
pronouncements for decades. Several years ago he offered a distillation of his view that 
judges should look only to the language of the law Congress passed. ‘The statute is what 
Congress voted on, not what some committee member said he thought it meant,’ Scalia said. 
‘I don’t care what he thought it meant, since the rest of the Congress didn’t know what he 
thought it meant when they voted for the law.’”). Even to the point that consultation of 
legislative history in Supreme Court opinions as a whole has decreased drastically since the 
1980s. James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, The Decline and Fall of Legislative History? Patterns 
of Supreme Court Reliance in the Burger and Rehnquist Eras, 89 JUDICATURE 220, 220 (2006). 
 69. United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (1 Cranch) 358, 386 (1805). 
 70. Manning, supra note 30, at 93. 
 71. Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 132 (1998) (citing 114 CONG. REC. 22,231 
(1968) (statement of Rep. Poff)). 
 72. 114 CONG. REC. 22,243–44 (1968) (statement of Rep. Hunt). 
 73. Id. at 22,244 (statement of Rep. Randall). 
 74. Id. at 22,236 (statement of Rep. Meskill). 
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Two of the chief criticisms textualists raise against using 
legislative history for policy-based context are that (1) legislative 
history is not actually the law, and (2) even if it were the law, 
Congress has no single intent—rather, it is best described as a 
“they” not an “it.”75  First, textualists assert that legislative history 
is not actually the law, and “it is not to be supposed that, in signing 
a bill the President endorses the whole Congressional Record.”76 
After all, if interpreters did care about subjective congressional 
intent, it would violate notice. One frequently cited example in 
support of this theory is a legend surrounding the infamous Roman 
emperor Caligula who ordered that his laws be written in tiny print 
and posted on high pillars, thus preventing the Roman citizens 
from knowing the laws to which they were subject.77 
Second, some of the most vehement criticism of legislative 
history is in response to the assumption that Congress had any 
intent on a specific issue,78 the argument being that meaning is 
found “not in the subjective, multiple mind of Congress but in the 
understanding of the objectively reasonable person.”79 In short, the 
battle cry of the textualists could be summed up in the statement: 
“Congress is a ‘they,’ not an ‘it.’”80 Finally, there is also the worry 
that legislative history is susceptible to manipulation or “salting the 
 
 75. Kenneth R. Dortzbach, Legislative History: The Philosophies of Justices Scalia and 
Breyer and the Use of Legislative History by the Wisconsin State Courts, 80 MARQ. L. REV. 161, 
162–63 (1996). But see Victoria F. Nourse, A Decision Theory of Statutory Interpretation: 
Legislative History by the Rules, 122 YALE L.J. 70, 73 (2012) (Comparing legislative history to 
case law, Professor Nourse responds by stating that “[n]o lawyer would confuse a dissent 
with a majority opinion, or pleadings with jury instructions, and yet the equivalent occurs 
regularly in standard judicial and scholarly legislative histories. Scholars and law students 
dismantle congressional reports and debates as if early reports (at the pleading stage) were 
interchangeable with much-altered bills (jury instructions) and as if statements of those who 
lost the debate (dissenting opinions) amount to authoritative statements of meaning 
(majority opinions).”). 
 76. Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 396 (1951) (Jackson, 
J., concurring). 
 77. PETER HAY, THE BOOK OF LEGAL ANECDOTES 236 (1989). 
 78. Justice Holmes remarked that “[w]e do not inquire what the legislature meant; we 
ask only what the statute means.” Holmes, supra note 63. 
 79. See Easterbrook, supra note 5, at 65. 
 80. Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 
12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239, 244 (1992). 
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record.”81 One of the chief criticisms of using legislative history to 
form interpretive opinions is that it amounts to little more than 
scanning over a crowd to find one’s friends.82 Indeed, the Supreme 
Court has characterized legislative history as “murky, ambiguous, 
and contradictory.”83 
B. Semantic Context 
Although the legislative history surrounding a given statute 
may appear “murky, ambiguous, and contradictory”84 when trying 
to divine a policy or purpose, it is much clearer when uncovering 
the semantic meaning. So even when James Madison decried using 
the legislative history surrounding the drafting of the Constitution 
to determine meaning, he acknowledged that it might still be 
“presumptive evidence of the general understanding at the time of 
the language used.”85 Legislative history thus has “semantic value 
when the materials are cited as evidence of how terms were used and 
what assumptions were made” by the legislature.86 These assump-
tions are reflected in the legislative history by the legislature’s 
usage and habits of speech,87  “[b]ecause legislators and their staff 
study how language can be manipulated, [and] that knowledge 
shapes the meaning of the text chosen.”88 Thus, looking to semantic 
context is similar to turning to a dictionary for a definition. In fact, 
 
 81. See MANNING & STEPHENSON, supra note 10, at 153–54. If the legislative history is 
expanded beyond the statute in question to include the entire Congressional Record, the 
probability of someone salting the record across multiple debates becomes an exceedingly 
unlikely, and indeed, Herculean effort. 
 82. Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 
Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 214 (1983) (quoting Judge Harold Leventhal). 
 83. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005). 
 84. Id. 
 85. Letter from James Madison to M.L. Hurlbert (May 1830), reprinted in 9 THE 
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 372 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910). The Congressional Record collects 
the language Congress produces, including floor statements, debates, bills, resolutions, and 
motions proposed. Congressional Record, supra note 3. 
 86. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Should the Supreme Court Read The Federalist but Not 
Statutory Legislative History?, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1301, 1315 (1998). 
 87. As proponents of legislative history assert, “[i]f the legislative process has its own 
assumptions and word usages, the process itself should be the context within which we seek 
a statute’s meaning.” McGreal, supra note 64, at 373. 
 88. JELLUM & HRICIK, supra note 6, at 235. 
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some interpreters have referred to the legislative history—and thus 
the Congressional Record—as a specialized dictionary.89 
Turning to the legislative history in this manner “at least may 
alert the interpreter to the possible complexities of the language 
used in the statute.”90 This is true because “[e]ven if the proper aim 
of statutory interpretation is to seek ‘objective meaning’ rather than 
‘subjective intent,’ knowing the legislative and other history sur-
rounding enactment inevitably affects conclusions about what 
those words—even . . . seemingly clear [words]—’objectively’ 
mean.”91 In other words, this use of legislative history represents 
“meta-intent, or background understandings about language and 
terminology (relevant to textualists) as well as values and norms 
(relevant to normativists).”92 
One aspect of congressional usage is reflected in the fact that 
legislators “try to leave as little meaning to context as possible, at 
times creating word usages that have no parallel in ordinary conversa-
tion.”93 Thus, the practice of arguing about meaning and looking to 
the legislative history might encourage legislators to adopt usages 
that are not employed by the ordinary public. Further, “[i]gnoring 
legislative history” may actually “prevent[] the interpreter from 
understanding the context in which the legislator used the words 
written into the statutory text.”94 The interpreter is prevented from 
understanding the meaning of the legislature’s words by ignoring 
the history of the subject matter that “even without the legislative 
history of the Act, helps inform our understanding of the way in 
which the legislators used [the terms] in the statute.”95 
A common example of using the legislative history to deter-
mine semantic context is to decide whether Congress used a term 
in its ordinary or technical sense. In Nix v. Hedden,96 the Supreme 
 
 89. Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s 
Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1187 (2003). 
 90. Carol Chomsky, Unlocking the Mysteries of Holy Trinity: Spirit, Letter, and History in 
Statutory Interpretation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 901, 952 (2000). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Eskridge, supra note 46, at 1537. 
 93. McGreal, supra note 64, at 373 (emphasis added). 
 94. Chomsky, supra note 90, at 952. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Nix v. Hedden, 149 U.S. 304 (1893). 
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Court analyzed the classic fifth-grader’s question: Is a tomato a 
vegetable or a fruit? Surprisingly, the Supreme Court determined 
that a tomato is actually a vegetable for the purposes of the Tariff 
Act of March 3, 1833.97 The Court noted, “Botanically speaking, 
tomatoes are the fruit of a vine, just as are cucumbers, squashes, 
beans, and peas. But in the common language of the people, 
whether sellers or consumers of provisions, all these are vege-
tables.”98 In response to the Court’s holding, one might question 
whether the Court should have looked to the legislative history to 
see if members of Congress understood themselves to be using 
terms such as “‘fruit’” in their ordinary or technical sense. 
Looking for the context in which words are used is also a 
familiar practice to determine trade usage in contracts. Judge 
Easterbrook described trade usage as “meanings that members of 
the trade or calling out of which the contract arose would attach to 
apparently clear words, phrases, or sentences[.]”99 These meanings 
“may be different from the meaning that these ‘clear’ terms bear in 
ordinary discourse[.]”100 When a community beyond just the two 
contracting parties uses a term in a specific manner, the usage 
becomes “objectively verifiable” and “is evidence about what 
words, phrases, etc. mean to a community, not merely to a pair of 
individuals; it is evidence about a public, not a private, language—
evidence that is the equivalent, really, of a specialized dictionary.”101 
This “specialized dictionary” use is another way that legislative 
history can be used to study semantic context.102 Like a dictionary, 
however, legislative history may provide a range of possible mean-
ings while still failing to provide a determinant ordinary meaning 
of the term. While dictionaries may be used without controversy as 
 
 97. The Court noted a similar question of whether beans were seeds: “Both are seeds 
in the language of botany or natural history, but not in commerce nor in common parlance.” 
Id. at 307 (citing Robertson v. Salomon, 130 U.S. 412, 414 (1889)). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Bristow v. Drake St. Inc., 41 F.3d 345, 352 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. (emphasis added). 
 102. Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 89, at 1186–89. 
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a matter of judicial notice,103 the definitions provided by legislative 
history may not always be so reliable. Finally, dictionaries them-
selves have recently come under criticism when relied upon to 
determine ordinary public meaning.104 
Using legislative history is vulnerable to many of the same 
pitfalls as using a dictionary. The problems inherent in using 
dictionaries have been duly noted in the academic literature.105 One 
such problem is confirmation bias.106 While many think that the 
dictionary is an infallible fortress of meaning, it is important to 
remember that each definition was selected by a person making a 
conscious decision subject to confirmation bias. This conscious 
decision is similar to asking a person on the street for the objective 
meaning of a word. It may be difficult to get an accurate, repre-
sentative definition from that one person. It is far easier to walk 
down the street and listen for the way that word is repeatedly used 
in context.107 In fact, this is the way children first acquire most of 
their language. 
Ironically, the usages given in the debate surrounding the 
actual statute are the ones most likely to be distorted.108 This 
distortion may be inadvertent or it may be the result of the 
congressional speech community trying to “salt the record” to 
 
 103. Dictionaries may be used as a matter of judicial notice to define unknown terms 
or to determine that a proposed definition is in fact a recorded linguistic possibility. 
Mouritsen, supra note 19, at 1921 n.44 and accompanying text. 
 104. See generally id. (expounding criticisms of using dictionaries to determine 
ordinary meaning). 
 105. See id.; A. Raymond Randolph, Dictionaries, Plain Meaning, and Context in Statutory 
Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 71, 72 (1994). 
 106. “[O]ur tendency [is] to selectively look for information that conforms to our 
hypothesis and to overlook information that argues against it.” E. BRUCE GOLDSTEIN, 
COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY: CONNECTING MIND, RESEARCH, AND EVERYDAY EXPERIENCE 374 (3d 
ed. 2011). 
 107. This, of course, oversimplifies this method of language acquisition. Some words 
are seldom said or are even restricted to narrow speech communities. Some words are even 
restricted to specific streets. This is a problem that is frequently overlooked in our Internet 
age that carries over into the problem of selecting a proper corpus. Have our speech 
communities shrunk as widespread communication has increased? 
 108. See supra note 12. For this reason, the usage surrounding other statutes within the 
same two-year congressional term more objectively reflects congressional usage. See 
discussion infra Section IV.A.1.b for a more-detailed discussion of why the two-year 
congressional term adequately reflects the congressional speech community while avoiding 
the likelihood of distortion mentioned here. 
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favor a particular interpretation when judges or agencies seek to 
understand a statute. Indeed, the Congressional Record may contain 
more than just the language of Congress. Justice Scalia warned that 
committee reports are written “at best by a committee staff member 
on his or her own initiative, and at worst by a committee staff 
member at the suggestion of a lawyer-lobbyist; and the purpose of 
those references was not primarily to inform . . . Congress what the 
bill meant . . . but rather to influence judicial construction.”109 For 
these reasons, meaning can usually be most accurately determined 
if the “definer” is unaware that she is being observed in her 
language usage.110 Legislative history’s best use for interpretation 
is thus not to discover how Congress defines a term, but rather how 
Congress uses a term.111 
Words only have meaning in a specific community and context. 
If the shared statutory speech community is to be understood, 
legislative history is a necessary piece of the puzzle, together with 
public meaning. Ordinary congressional meaning is not just how 
two parties (or two legislators) use a term, but rather how a 
community (Congress) uses a term.112 If this is true, then it follows 
that there is a strong chance that there are hidden nuggets of 
congressional semantic meaning in the legislative record; the 
problem is that interpreters cannot always distinguish the fool’s 
gold from the genuine article.113 
 
 109. Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 98–99 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 110. During contract formulation, however, the precise definition is determined while 
the drafter is keenly aware of being observed. 
 111. Similarly, corpus linguistics analyzes how a word is used, not the definition it is 
given. For example, finding the definition of the word “_____” in the dictionary as compared 
to Professor Mascott’s using the dictionary as a corpus to find how the dictionary uses 
“_____” to define other words. Mascott, supra note 12, at 1558–59. 
 112. See Bristow v. Drake St. Inc., 41 F.3d 345, 352 (7th Cir. 1994), for Judge Posner’s 
discussion of trade usage. 
 113. These mistakes may be innocent or insidious. For example, in Muscarello v. United 
States, Justice Breyer searched a newspaper database. 524 U.S. 125, 129 (1998). Other judges 
have done likewise; Judge Richard Posner “recognized the deficiencies of standard 
methods—principally, dictionaries—in answering” which sense is most ordinary, “[s]o he 
proceeded to a search for data, and he did so using the tool that is perhaps most familiar to 
us today. He performed a Google search.” Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 8, at 799–800. Yet this 
use is still susceptible to picking friends out of a crowd. 
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III. FINDING A UNIFIED CONGRESSIONAL INTENT 
THROUGH CORPUS LINGUISTICS 
I believe that many of the concerns with using legislative 
history to inform context—such as the difficulty of finding the 
intent of a multimember body or having the record subject to 
manipulation—can be resolved by looking at legislative history 
data as a whole instead of referring to isolated data points. Thus, 
the first step for interpreters seeking to resolve the selective use of 
legislative history is to select and organize the appropriate body of 
language, or corpus (plural corpora), into a lexical database. One 
method of organizing a lexical database is through corpus 
linguistics. These corpora can be created relatively simply with 
freely available software, and lexical databases representing the 
ordinary public meaning have already been created. These corpora 
include the Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA),114 
the Corpus of Historical American English (COHA),115 and the 
Corpus of Founding Era American English (COFEA).116 
As noted above, while the ordinary public meaning is the most 
traditional measure of congressional intent, it may not be the most 
accurate. In fact, one criticism of these ordinary public meaning 
corpora is that while the “point of a large data set is to avoid basing 
conclusions on a few speakers’ idiosyncrasies . . . the idiosyncrasies 
of the [legislature] constitute the rule of law[.]”117 This results in 
“ignor[ing] the only speaker that matters” in an “attempt to eschew 
the influence of any one speaker.”118 
Two leaders in the law and corpus linguistics movement, Utah 
Supreme Court Justice Thomas R. Lee and Stephen C. Mouritsen, 
theorized that there might be a corpus that “would reflect dialogue 
 
 114. COCA, supra note 16. 
 115. COHA, supra note 16. 
 116. Corpus of Founding Era American English (COFEA), BYU LAW: LAW & CORPUS LIN-
GUISTICS, https://lawcorpus.byu.edu/cofea (last visited Jan. 19, 2019) [hereinafter COFEA]. 
 117. State v. Rasabout, 2015 UT 72, ¶ 21, 356 P.3d 1258, 1266 (internal quotations omitted). 
 118. Id. The majority’s assertion is an overstatement. Surely ordinary public meaning 
matters to those governed by the law. And even for finding the meaning intended by 
Congress, ordinary public meaning provides at least some evidence. 
 
J. MILLER_PAA.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 3/4/19  4:38 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2018 
1144 
among the 535 members [of the Congress] that voted on [a parti-
cular statute].”119 They continued on to posit that 
[i]f we had such a corpus, and if it recorded extensive discussion 
among [the members of Congress] about the [term] they were 
talking about when they enacted this statute, we might be able to 
get data of relevance to the intended meaning of this provision. 
Perhaps it would reveal only examples of [one sense] and never 
of [the other]. If so, that might tell us that the intended meaning is 
limited to the former.120 
If the Congressional Record were converted into a corpus, it 
would allow an interpreter to empirically analyze ordinary 
congressional word usage. Creating and analyzing this database is 
possible through the nascent field of law and corpus linguistics.121 
However, our expectations for corpus linguistics in general, and 
this tool specifically, should be tempered, since “[e]mpirical 
analysis of common usage will not by itself solve thorny questions 
of statutory interpretation . . . .”122 Rather, corpus linguistics (and 
the CRAC specifically) should be seen as just one of many useful 
tools of statutory interpretation to help the interpreter make a more 
informed decision.123 
A. The Congressional Record as a Corpus 
The Congressional Record contains “a substantially verbatim 
account of the remarks made by senators and representatives while 
they are on the floor of the Senate and the House of Representa-
tives. It also includes all bills, resolutions, and motions proposed, 
as well as debates and roll call votes.”124 If it were possible to turn 
the Congressional Record into a database, then this database would 
 
 119. Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 8, at 854. 
 120. Id. 
 121. For a brief introduction to corpus linguistics in the legal context, see Mouritsen, 
supra note 19, at 1954–66. 
 122. The Supreme Court 1997 Term, Leading Cases, 112 HARV. L. REV. 122, 365 (1998). 
 123. Id. 
 124. Congressional Record, supra note 3. 
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be helpful in determining congressional usage,125 since it is a near-
complete record of the congressional speech community.126 
However, sifting through the entire legislative record to find 
words in context is an infeasible, if not insurmountable, task. This 
process can be simplified through corpus linguistics. “[I]t cannot be 
denied,” notes one scholar, “that corpus linguistics is also 
frequently associated with a certain outlook on language. At the 
center of this outlook is that the rules of language are usage-based 
and that changes occur when speakers use language to com-
municate with each other.”127 However, this outlook “must be 
analyzed within some framework or understanding of ordinary 
meaning.”128 The understanding of ordinary meaning posited 
above requires a specialized corpus focused on the congressional 
speech community. 
In light of the lengthy list of corpora that already exist, a 
specialized congressional corpus may seem superfluous. However, 
 
 125. This process is similar to the process of creating a dictionary: “The editors make 
up this record by collecting examples of uses of the word to be defined, studying each use in 
context, and then forming a judgment about the meaning in that context.” HENRY M. HART, 
JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLI-
CATION OF LAW 1190 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Phillip P. Frickey eds., 1994). It might be 
helpful to imagine the Congressional Record similarly: The interpreter “make[s] up this record 
by collecting examples” of the legislators’ uses of the word in question, “studying each use 
in context” (whether debate, committee report, etc.) before “forming a judgment about the 
meaning in that context.” See id. 
 126. While the vast majority of the Congressional Record reflects the speech of Congress, 
there are also some segments that come from congressional staffers, or even the public (e.g., 
letters from constituents). The potential for these sources to pollute the corpus is briefly 
addressed in the conclusion. See Conclusion infra. 
 127. HANS LINDQUIST, CORPUS LINGUISTICS AND THE DESCRIPTION OF ENGLISH 1 (2009). 
 128. See Gries & Slocum, supra note 41, at 1441–42, for a discussion on some of the 
ordinary meaning frameworks particularly relevant to corpus linguistics (“The concept 
underlying corpus linguistics is also consistent with the idea that an ordinary meaning is one 
that, in some sense, is general and cuts across contexts. Corpus-linguistic analyses are 
‘always based on the evaluation of some kind of frequencies,’ and frequency is a crucial 
aspect of what distinguishes an ordinary meaning from some meaning that is perhaps 
grammatical but unordinary. Corpus linguistics can illustrate not only the number of senses 
(i.e., meanings) a linguistic expression may have but also which meaning is most frequently 
used. It can provide clues as to what the most prototypical meaning of an expression might 
be based on various factors [highest frequency, most even dispersion, earliest acquired, 
central in network of senses, meaning with the highest number of features with the highest 
cue validities] . . . . Of course, corpus linguistics requires a (testable) conceptual leap from 
frequencies to the issue being researched by the user. Thus, any corpus findings must be 
analyzed within some framework or understanding of ordinary meaning.”). 
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these generalized corpora may not be ideally suited for all 
purposes: “For example, . . . a general corpus of online language 
would be a poor choice if a researcher is interested in the technical 
legal meaning of [a] term . . . .”129 If statutory interpretation 
requires only what the statute means in the ear of the ordinary 
person, then a generalized public meaning corpus is most likely 
adequate to represent ordinary public meaning. But if statutory 
meaning is more accurately represented by a shared statutory 
speech community that includes ordinary congressional usage, 
then a more specialized corpus is also needed. 
B. Making a Corpus 
Currently, “[l]inguistic corpora can be built from the ground up 
using text or speech from any given speech community or 
register.”130 A basic understanding of what goes into creating a 
corpus is essential to evaluating the applicability of a particular 
corpus to a given problem of statutory interpretation.131 When 
creating a corpus, some of the most important characteristics to 
consider are representativeness (or content) and size.132 
 
 129. James C. Phillips & Jesse Egbert, Advancing Law and Corpus Linguistics: Importing 
Principles and Practices from Survey and Content-Analysis Methodologies to Improve Corpus 
Design and Analysis, 2017 BYU L. REV. 1589, 1595 (2017). “While it is not necessarily 
problematic to reuse a corpus for more than one study, it is critical to understand that a 
corpus that is representative for one research purpose may be entirely the wrong corpus for 
a different purpose.” Id. 
 130. Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 8, at 832. For the purposes of this Note, corpora for 
both sessions of the 90th Congress (1967 and 1968) were created using a freely available 
corpus development software called AntConc. See AntConc Homepage, LAURENCE 
ANTHONY’S WEBSITE, http://www.laurenceanthony.net/software/antconc (last visited 
Jan. 19, 2018); 113 CONG. REC. (1967) (90th Cong., 1st Sess.); 114 CONG. REC. (1968) (90th 
Cong., 2d Sess.). 
 131. Phillips & Egbert, supra note 129, at 1593–94. In addition, creating a corpus is not 
out of reach for the average judge or attorney: “freely available software, such as AntConc, 
enables researchers to analyze their own modestly-sized corpus.” Id. at 1593. Indeed, creating 
a corpus is often intuitive, and a better understanding of corpus linguistics will offer a 
marked improvement in determining meaning over mere intuition. 
 132. See Edward Finegan, Comments on James C. Phillips & Jesse Egbert, Advancing Law 
and Corpus Linguistics: Importing Principles and Practices from Survey and Content-Analysis 
Methodologies to Improve Corpus Design and Analysis, 2017 BYU L. REV. 1297, 1302–03 (2017); 
Douglas Biber, Using Register-Diversified Corpora for General Language Studies, in 19 
COMPUTATIONAL LINGUISTICS 219, 240 (1993). 
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1. Representativeness  
A corpus should represent a given speech community. The 
measure of representativeness in a corpus is “the extent to which a 
sample includes the full range of variability in a population.”133 
Representativeness is a daunting ideal, but it is not “all-or-
nothing.”134 Some scholars remind us that “[j]ust because it may not 
be possible to design a perfectly representative corpus does not 
mean we should not strive for that ideal . . . .”135 
Following the insights gained from communications theory,136 
the relevant speech community for statutory interpretation must 
include both the public and Congress. Seeing as current corpora 
focus on broader speech communities representing the ordinary 
public meaning,137 it is propitious to create a legislative corpus to 
use in conjunction with corpora such as COCA, COHA, or 
COFEA.138 In fact, COFEA already approaches this ideal, including 
documents such as “letters, diaries, sermons, speeches, debates, . . . 
government materials, [and] legal documents” from the founding 
members of Congress.139 
Thus, at the very least, any corpus purporting to represent the 
shared statutory speech community should include the Congres-
sional Record in addition to “ordinary”140 texts such as transcripts of 
 
 133. Douglas Biber, Representativeness in Corpus Design, in 8 LITERARY & LINGUISTIC 
COMPUTING 243, 243 (1993). 
 134. Phillips & Egbert, supra note 129, at 1594. 
 135. Id. 
 136. See supra Part I. 
 137. For example, “the NOW Corpus records the language use of a single, large speech 
community (the United States) in a single linguistic register (newsprint).” Lee & Mouritsen, 
supra note 8, at 834. Further, Lee and Mouritsen hypothesize that “if the interpretation of a 
federal statute requires us to consider the linguistic norms and conventions of the citizens 
subject to that statute, then U.S. newsprint may be the appropriate speech community and 
register.” Id. 
 138. Or in the words of Dr. Seuss, “If I can’t find a [legislative corpus], I’ll make one 
instead!” Cf. DR. SEUSS, HOW THE GRINCH STOLE CHRISTMAS 15 (1957) (noting that if one 
cannot find something, one should make it). 
 139. James C. Phillips, Daniel M. Ortner & Thomas R. Lee, Corpus Linguistics & Original 
Public Meaning: A New Tool to Make Originalism More Empirical, 126 YALE L.J. F. 21, 30 (2016). 
COFEA also contains nonlegislative materials including “newspapers, court opinions, . . . 
pamphlets, broadsides, non-fiction books, and fiction writing from the Founding Era.” Id. 
These different registers, however, can be excluded from any search. 
 140. COCA, supra note 16. 
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spoken English and written “fiction, popular magazines, news-
papers, and academic texts.”141 Otherwise, only one side of the 
conversation is being represented. 
2. Size  
One of the most important considerations when creating a 
corpus is size: “Corpus size is incredibly important, in terms of the 
richness of the corpus data. A tiny one million word corpus is 
extremely limited in terms of the phenomena that it can study—
compared to a 400 million word corpus, where there might be 400 
times as much data.”142 For example, one of the most popular 
corpora,143 the Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA) 
“contains more than 560 million words of text (20 million words 
each year 1990–2017) and it is equally divided among spoken 
[English], fiction, popular magazines, newspapers, and academic 
texts.”144 Another corpus, the Corpus of Founding Era American 
English (COFEA), contains more than 150 million words.145 
The Congressional Record could be used as a corpus by breaking 
it into individual speech communities of two years. The two-year 
interval is most adequate because the senators and representatives 
comprising the speech community change every two years.146 The 
Congressional Record begins when the new legislators are sworn in 
and a new session of Congress begins. While the body of Congress 
may change slightly in the interim due to resignations or deaths, I 
am assuming that those changes are relatively infrequent and 
insignificant. On each page of the Congressional Record there are 
 
 141. Id. Advocating the inclusion of the Congressional Record with natural language 
documents is similar to Jennifer L. Mascott’s idea to include Founding Era dictionaries in the 
Corpus of Founding Era American English. See Mascott, supra note 12, at 1588. (“As COFEA 
is developed, founding era dictionaries perhaps should be included alongside the corpus’s 
natural language documents.”). 
 142. Size, CORPUS.BYU.EDU, https://corpus.byu.edu/size.asp (last visited Jan. 19, 2019). 
 143. “The Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA) is the largest freely-
available corpus of English, and the only large and balanced corpus of American English. 
COCA is probably the most widely-used corpus of English, and it is related to many other 
corpora of English that we have created, which offer unparalleled insight into variation in 
English.” COCA, supra note 16. 
 144. Id. 
 145. COFEA, supra note 116. 
 146. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2. 
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approximately 1385 words. Multiplied by approximately 25,951 
pages per volume147 equals about 36,000,000 words per volume. 
With two sessions in each year of Congress, the Congressional Record 
contains approximately 70,000,000 words per year. Finally, the 
composition of legislators changes every two years, so the speech 
community is valid for two-year periods, creating a corpus of 
approximately 140,000,000 words. Thus, each two-year mini-
corpus would include approximately 140,000,000 words. 
C. Possible Criticisms of the Congressional Record 
as Corpus Approach148 
This approach is not without its flaws. Some of these flaws are 
common to all corpora, others to legislative history, and still others 
arise because of uniting the two. First, various criticisms of corpus 
linguistics in general have been advanced. One scholar mentioned 
several of these criticisms; namely, that a corpus (1) cannot present 
a full picture of the speech community analyzed, (2) may be 
anachronistic, and (3) may not be representative.149 While many of 
these criticisms break down when applied to using the Congres-
sional Record as a corpus, new potential problems arise to take their 
place. These will also be considered. 
1. Full picture of speech community analyzed 
The first of these criticisms is that no corpus can present a full 
picture of the speech community analyzed. Mouritsen counters this 
criticism by noting that this is only a valid concern when the 
legislature “has regulated certain conduct using highly specialized 
language.”150 In other words, the assumption is that the legislature 
speaks, or at least should be interpreted, in terms the ordinary 
person would readily understand. 
 
 147. The number of pages per volume has varied over time. For example, the first 
volume of the Congressional Record contains 5500 pages. 1 CONG. REC. (1874). 
 148. See Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 8, at 865–73, for a thorough discussion of various 
criticisms of law and corpus linguistics. (“The criticisms that we have considered fall into 
three categories: proficiency, propriety, and practicality. Each concern has an element of 
viability but crumbles under careful scrutiny.”). 
 149. Mouritsen, supra note 19, at 1966–70. 
 150. Id. at 1967. 
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Using the Congressional Record as a corpus resolves this concern 
even more conclusively because the Congressional Record is actually 
a rare occurrence of a near-complete record of the speech commu-
nity analyzed: “The Congressional Record is a substantially verbatim 
account of the remarks made by senators and representatives while 
they are on the floor of the Senate and the House of Represent-
atives. It also includes all bills, resolutions, and motions proposed, 
as well as debates and roll call votes.”151 
2. Anachronism 
 The second concern is that certain corpora may be anachron-
istic.152 While this concern has largely been remedied with the 
introduction of COHA, as a broader corpus than COCA, COHA 
still contains fewer words.153 While COCA contains a great number 
of words (spanning only from 1990 to the present), COHA covers a 
much longer period of time. One possible reason for a corpus to 
become anachronistic is that corpora must be updated regularly to 
stay current. The CRAC does not face this challenge because each 
two-year mini-corpus will represent the complete usage for that 
period. Even as new congressional sessions come every year, 
keeping the corpora divided into relevant two-year chunks will 
ensure they never become anachronistic. 
3. Representativeness 
 The third criticism combines with the first with respect to the 
CRAC. For most corpora, it is clear that a full picture of the speech 
community analyzed is impossible, so representativeness is a 
measure of how accurate the chosen sample will be. In the CRAC, 
 
 151. Congressional Record, supra note 3. 
 152. Inexplicably, this does not seem to be a concern when turning to a dictionary. See 
Mouritsen, supra note 19, at 1945–46 (“[D]ictionary editors . . . are likely to ‘give 
disproportionate attention to uncommon [uses],’ and to favor the language use—likely the 
anachronistic language use—of ‘prestigious authors’ (like the Muscarello Court’s Defoe 
and Melville).”). 
 153. Before COHA, one critic wrote that “[u]ntil this deficit is supplied, the [corpus] 
approach . . . is not practicable for old statutes.” Rickie Sonpal, Note, Old Dictionaries and New 
Textualists, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 2177, 2219 (2003). 
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the entire record of the speech community is included. Thus, the 
sample size is also the entire community. 
Yet while the CRAC may contain all the official written and oral 
transcripts of Congress, technically it is nevertheless still incom-
plete.154 This is because “[g]iven the infinite permutability of 
human language, the corpus can never capture every possible 
human utterance.” This remains true “even in a narrowly-defined 
speech community,”155 such as the United States Congress. Thus, 
the language that remains unrecorded will obviously not be 
represented in the corpus.  
IV. APPLICATION: MUSCARELLO V. UNITED STATES 
Corpus linguistics is most helpful in cases of lexical, as opposed 
to structural, ambiguity involving two (or more) competing defini-
tions. Muscarello v. United States,156 is perhaps the quintessential 
example of the ideal candidate for corpus analysis.157 The debate in 
Muscarello surrounded part of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe 
Streets Act of 1968, which states in part: 
Whoever, during and in relation to any crime of violence or 
drug trafficking crime . . . for which he may be prosecuted in a 
court of the United States, uses or carries a firearm, shall, in 
addition to the punishment provided for such crime of violence 
or drug trafficking crime, be sentenced to imprisonment for 
five years . . . .158 
Muscarello faced a five-year minimum for purchasing 
marijuana while his handgun remained locked in his glovebox.159 
The prosecution insisted that carries a firearm includes conveying it 
 
 154. There may be additional ways to expand the database of congressional usage—
members of Congress’s tweets, posts, articles, etc. But these outside statements may not be 
representative of congressional speech if a congresswoman is only a congresswoman when 
acting officially. In other words, it might be most representative to limit congressional speech 
to what occurs in the constitutionally mandated processes and not on social media. 
 155. Mouritsen, supra note 19, at 1969. 
 156. Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125 (1998). 
 157. Muscarello has been extensively analyzed beginning with Mouritsen’s article. See 
Mouritsen, supra note 19. Lee and Mouritsen then followed up on Mouritsen’s initial analysis 
in a subsequent article. See Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 8. 
 158. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (1994) (emphasis added). 
 159. Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 125–26. 
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in a vehicle. Muscarello argued that the phrase is limited to carry-
ing it on one’s person.160 
The Supreme Court engaged in a battle of meaning, with the 
majority firing off with the King James Bible, Robinson Crusoe, and 
Moby Dick, as well as two electronic newspaper databases and 
several unabridged dictionaries.161 The dissent’s answering salvo 
included a legal dictionary, several alternative translations of the 
Bible, and works of poetry.162 Their barrage continued with tele-
vision and movie quotes from The Magnificent Seven, M*A*S*H,163 
and even Sesame Street.164 When the dust settled, the majority 
declared that “the phrase ‘carries a firearm’ is [not] limited to the 
carrying of firearms on the person,” but extends to “a person who 
knowingly possesses and conveys firearms in a vehicle[.]”165 
Perhaps not unsurprisingly, this war of the words left many 
unsatisfied, including some on the Court: “Unlike the Court, I do 
not think dictionaries, surveys of press reports, or the Bible tell us, 
dispositively, what ‘carries’ means embedded in § 924(c)(1).”166 
A. Analyzing Ordinary Public Meaning in Muscarello 
Using COCA, COHA, and NOW 
One scholar, Stephen Mouritsen, expressed doubts about the 
methodology in Muscarello.167 Using corpus linguistics and the 
COCA and COHA, he determined that the Court’s broad 
interpretation, carry in a vehicle (carry1), is in fact less commonly 
used than the narrow interpretation, carry on a person (carry2).168 
Mouritsen found that “[v]irtually all of the concordance lines 
returned . . . featured uses of carry related to the physical carrying 
of an object, though it could not always be determined whether 
 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 129–30. 
 162. Id. at 143–44 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 163. Id. at 144 n.6. 
 164. Id. at 147 n.11. 
 165. Id. at 126–27 (majority opinion). 
 166. Id. at 142–43 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 167. See generally Mouritsen, supra note 19. 
 168. Id. at 1964–65. 
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carry1, or carry2, was intended.”169 So Mouritsen grouped his results 
into four categories: carry1, carry2, either, and neither.170 
 
Figure 1 — COCA171 
 carry1 carry2 either neither 
firearm(s) 0 28 20 2 
gun(s) 0 35 13 2 
handgun(s) 1 24 24 1 
rifle(s) 0 41 8 1 
pistol 2 15 7 1 
total 3 143 72 7 
 
Figure 2 — COHA172 
 carry1 carry2 either neither 
firearm(s) 0 2 1 0 
gun(s) 0 47 7 5 
rifle(s) 0 26 1 0 
pistol 0 10 2 0 
total 0 85 11 5 
 
Drawing upon this data, Mouritsen noted, “It is important to 
pause here and observe what these data do and do not tell us.”173 
He asserts that it would be “arbitrary” to conclude that § 924(c) 
should be interpreted as carry2 just because it is the most frequent 
use.174 While carry2 is arguably the ordinary public meaning, that 
doesn’t necessarily mean Congress intended carry2. Again, corpus 
linguistics does not resolve questions on the battlefield of inter-
pretive theory, it just clears the fog of war.  
 
 169. Id. at 1964. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at 1968. 
 173. Id. at 1964. 
 174. Id. 
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Since the purpose of the legislation (at least in the mind of one 
senator) was to “persuade the man who is tempted to commit a 
federal felony to leave his gun at home,”175 perhaps Congress 
intended a broader meaning of carry.  The imperative, do not carry a 
firearm, may thus include both carry1 and carry2. If the purpose is to 
decrease gun violence, it makes little difference to the legislature 
whether the gun is in the felon’s hand, purse, or glovebox. On the 
other hand, Congress’s purpose may have been narrower: to deter 
the kind of carrying most likely to lead to violence.176 Although the 
public is likely to use carry only to refer to carrying a firearm on 
one’s person—it does not follow that the public expects a 
sophisticated speaker like Congress to use the term in the same 
way. In fact, Mouritsen and Lee found in a subsequent article, using 
the News on the Web (NOW) corpus, that while carry2 is the most 
common public use, carry1 is also a possible use (albeit far 
less common).177 
B. Analyzing Ordinary Congressional Meaning 
in Muscarello Using CRAC 
While carry2 may be the more ordinary public meaning,178 it is 
not necessarily the more ordinary congressional meaning. To 
answer this question, I created a corpus from the Congressional 
Record. The first step was to download the Congressional Record for 
both sessions of the 90th Congress, 1967 and 1968, from 
HeinOnline.179 I then plugged this data for the 90th Congress into 
AntConc, a freely available tool for analyzing corpora. Clicking 
the word list tab revealed that this particular corpus contains 
323,667 different words (word types) and 118,522,349 individual 
words (word tokens). 
One challenge with creating a custom corpus is that it is not 
tagged like COCA or COHA would be. This means that more 
specialized, time-saving searches are not possible. Instead of being 
 
 175. Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 133 (1998). 
 176. Id. at 144–45 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 177. Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 8, at 848. 
 178. If the interpreter can even decide what ordinary meaning means. See supra note 59. 
 179. The downloaded files for 1967 and 1968 are collected here: https://tinyurl.com 
/outofmanyonecorpusdata. 
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able to limit to verb uses (search term is “[carry].[v*]”), I had to 
manually comb through the 54,118 concordance lines to find 1080 
concordance lines using carry as a verb with a firearm of some sort 
(including the term weapon(s)). From these lines, I randomly 
selected 100 lines to review more closely. I limited these lines to 
those in which carry (or one of its derivatives) co-occurred with 
words such as firearm(s), gun(s), pistol(s), handgun(s), or rifles(s).180 
Like Mouritsen, I grouped the results into four categories: carry1, 
carry2, either, and neither. The results are included below in 
Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3 — CRAC181 
 carry1 vehicle carry2 person either neither 
firearm(s) 6 7 25 0 
gun(s) 4 5 11 0 
rifle(s) 1 2 1 0 
pistol 2 7 11 0 
weapon(s) 0 2 9 0 
total 13 25 62 0 
 
C. Analyzing Ordinary Statutory Meaning in Muscarello 
Using Both Ordinary Public Meaning and Ordinary 
Congressional Meaning Corpora 
When the COCA, COHA, NOW, and CRAC corpora are 
compared, both usages of carry are frequent. In fact, as compared 
 
 180. Mouritsen excluded weapon(s), “even though the term appears among the top-
hundred collocates of carry. Though all firearms are weapons, the reverse is not true and a 
preliminary examination of weapon(s) in the corpus suggested that many if not most of the 
weapons referenced were not firearms.” Mouritsen, supra note 19, at 1963 n.250. In my 
corpus, however, because nearly all the weapon(s) referenced were firearms, I did not 
exclude the term. Also, I included the terms derringer, six-shooter, and handgun with pistol(s); 
the terms carbine and shotgun with rifle(s); the term long gun with gun(s); and the term arm(s) 
with firearm(s). There were also seven concordance lines that included more than one term. I 
counted these in the overall total of whether the line best supported carry1, carry2, either, or 
neither. But I did not assign the lines to an individual term. 
 181. See supra note 180. The concordance lines are available here: https://tinyurl.com 
/outofmanyonecorpusdata. 
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to the ordinary public meaning results represented in Figure 1 and 
Figure 2, the ordinary congressional usage of carry1 and carry2 is 
roughly equal. Thus, while it may be more colloquial to use carry to 
refer to carrying a firearm on one’s person, Congress is equally like-
ly to use either meaning. If the congressional and public meanings 
had aligned, then the interpreter would have a strong argument for 
choosing the aligned meaning. But even though there has been a 
communication breakdown between the congressional speech com-
munity and the public speech community, comparing ordinary pub-
lic meaning and ordinary congressional meaning corpora is helpful. 
Since Congress is just as likely to use either meaning, and the 
public favors carry2 as the most common meaning, the interpreter 
might conclude that carry2 is the best meaning. On the other hand, 
since the public also recognizes carry1 as a possible meaning, the 
interpreter could conclude the statutory meaning should encom-
pass both terms. Ultimately, the interpreter is left with a pure choice 
of interpretive legal theory. Since there is not a clear consensus of 
meaning, the interpreter must choose between focusing on pro-
moting notice with the more ordinary meaning of carry referring to 
just on one’s person, or the congressional meaning of carrying on 
either one’s person or in a vehicle. But comparing the corpora in 
this way still empirically demonstrates that there is not a clear 
consensus between the public and Congress on what carry means. 
Thus, when the interpreter decides on a normative preference, it 
will at least be a transparent decision.182 
CONCLUSION 
As the field of law and corpus linguistics continues to develop, 
different corpora can be created to represent and compare different 
speech communities. And these corpora can help academics and 
judges be transparent in fundamental decisions of legal theory 
involving notice and congressional intent. Thus, anyone on the 
ideological statutory interpretation spectrum can benefit by 
carefully considering what corpus linguistics has to offer. 
 
 182. See supra note 22. 
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It is important to note that the CRAC corpus is polluted to some 
extent. The corpus should reflect the relevant speech community, 
which at a minimum is the 535 members of Congress and at the 
maximum might include the entire congressional staff.183 Yet the 
Congressional Record contains some documents that are not 
authored by Congress, such as letters from the public that are 
occasionally appended to the Congressional Record. I attempted to 
filter them out manually, but it is clear that for this to be a viable 
project going forward, a more carefully constructed corpus with all 
texts from the ordinary public removed must be created. However, 
I hope that this Note’s contribution sparks further analysis and 
scholarship on the interplay between ordinary public meaning and 
ordinary congressional meaning. Harmonizing them will allow 
interpreters to study the shared statutory speech community and 
more accurately define and describe ordinary meaning. 
 
Justin A. Miller* 
  
 
 183. Though the staff members do not enact laws, they closely associate with the law-
makers every day, and I assume that their conversations with the lawmakers reflect a similar 
vernacular and usage in the course of congressional duties. 
 *  J.D. candidate, April 2019, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. 
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